Abstract: It has been frequently asserted that the western Roman supreme commander Stilicho's neglect of the Transalpine provinces during the usurpation of Constantine III contributed to his eventual downfall in 408. Stilicho's fatal flaw, in this recurring opinion, seems to have been a desire to annex eastern Illyricum for which he sought to employ Alaric. In a volte-face, he then wished to use Alaric as the leader of the western field army that was supposed to bring down Constantine. The aim of this article is to advance several notes of critique on this narrative that has had a long life in Stilichonian scholarship. Instead it will demonstrate that a) the threat of Constantine has been overestimated, b) Stilicho had no designs on annexing eastern Illyricum, c) he had a military strategy ready against Constantine that was sound and in tandem with earlier civil wars, and d) that the intended role of Alaric during this enterprise has been misunderstood. Nevertheless, Stilicho's military strategy in 408 proved to be fundamentally corrosive towards his hitherto carefully built-up political capital. Olympius, the architect of his demise and his precise knowledge of Stilicho's army preparations, as befitted the magister officiorium, provided the former with the perfect material to fabricate stories of Stilicho coveting a throne while neglecting the west. This set in motion the plot that ultimately brought down Stilicho.
I The aftermath of the Radagaisan War and the British usurpations
Before Constantine was hailed emperor by the British field army and crossed over to the continent in 407, Stilicho had achieved the greatest military victory of his career. 1 During the summer of 406 he had brought down in Italy several large barbarian armies united under the leadership of the Gothic rex Radagaisus.
2 As a result, the western Roman army was reinforced with thousands of former barbarian followers, while so many others were enslaved and auctioned off that the market allegedly crashed.
3 Nevertheless, this victory came at a price. That the impact of Radagaisus' invasion was as dire as some of the most alarming sources report seems confirmed by various factors. Radagaisus' army had ravaged Italy from the Alps to Tuscany for more than half a year before Stilicho had finally mustered a force large enough to tackle the main barbarian force. The fact that he even took some northern Italic cities by storm, though unspecified but most probably all walled, was ominous enough in its own right. 4 More portentous was the fact that not all of Radagaisus' war-bands had been vanquished and several of these crossed over the Alps and eventually helped trigger both the crossing of the Rhine-frontier by Alans, Vandals and Sueves in 406/407, and a state of panic in Gaul. 5 It is against the backdrop of this mayhem that we need to consider Constantine's usurpation.
In contrast to most of the third century, when the island was generally quiescent, from the Tetrarchy to the Theodosian dynasty Britain proved to be a province with a particular penchant for political uprisings. One reason for this was Britain's remoteness from imperial centres of patronage, especially when emperors were not residing in Trier. No emperor visited Britain again after Constans I in early 343, meaning there was less opportunity for regional elites to 1 On Stilicho, see PLRE 1: "Stilicho," 853-858. Mazzarino (1942) ; Cameron (1970) ; Matthews (1975), 253-283; O'Flynn (1983), 14-62; Janssen (2004) ; McEvoy (2013) , 1141-1186. For general studies on western Roman history in this particular era, see Stein (1968) ; Heather (2005) ; Halsall (2007) ; Börm (2013) ; Lee (2013a Wijnendaele (2016a) . 3 Barbarian auxiliaries: Olympiod. Fr. 9 (ed. Blockley 1983) and discussed later. Barbarian slaves: Oros. 7.36.16. 4 Chron. Gall. 452, 52. 5 Wijnendaele (2016a) , 276-278 with discussion of the sources. accumulate wealth and status through imperial benefactions. 6 In the long run this proved to be a recipe for discontent. Ambitious men who had grand designs on imperial power usually found British troops willing to throw their weight behind their candidature. Thus, the island formed a bastion for the usurpations of Carausius (286), Allectus (293), Constantine I (306) and Magnus Maximus (383), and unswervingly joined usurpations launched from Gaul, such as those of Magnentius (350) , Julian (360) , and Eugenius (392).
7 Indeed, one contemporary author refers to Britain specifically as a "province rich in usurpers" (Britannia fertilis provincia tyrannorum).
8 In 406, twelve years after the defeat of Eugenius, no less than three British usurpers were at a fast pace promoted and demoted depending on the whim of the army that raised them, until Constantine III became their final choice.
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Constantine crossed the Channel during the spring of 407, but the limits of his military power were apparent from the very beginning. He was not able to defeat the Alans, Vandals and Sueves in pitched battle, but rather struck treaties with them. 10 What we see here is the long shadow cast by the horrendous defeat of the western Roman army at the Frigidus in 394: in the decade that followed western forces were constantly required to juggle one challenge after the other, especially in Italy and the Balkans, without having the proper time to re-build themselves to full strength. Consequentially, both Britain and Gaul had to transfer some of their standing units to Italy when it was faced with significant challenges to domestic security, such as Alaric's first intrusion at the beginning of the century (Claud. de bello Get. 448). The field army that Constantine III took to Gaul will have been a pale shade of the former army that had propped up his namesake a century earlier. This becomes most apparent during Constantine's advance on the continent.
6 Visit of Constans I: Lib. Or. 59.137; Amm. 20.1.1. If one were pedantic, one could remark that the eastern Roman emperor Manuel II Palaiologos visited England during the winter of 1400/1401, though naturally this emperor had hardly any control over territory in mainland Europe, let alone the British isle. 7 Some of these have been better studied than others; for the specific British background in every case, see Birley (2005), 371-460. 8 Hier. Ep. 133.9. Zos. 4.35 .3 also describes the army of Britain dominated by "insolence and irascibility" (αὐθαδεíᾳ καì θυμῷ). 9 PLRE 2: "Fl. Claudius Constantinus 21," 316-317; "Gratianus 3," 518-519; "Marcus 2," 719-720. For Constantine's reign, see Drinkwater (1998) ; Kulikowski (2000) , 332-341. 10 Zos 6.3.1-2 has sometimes been read as referring to a victory of Constantine III's forces over these barbarians, but see the criticisms of Paschoud (1989 ), 28-30, Birley (2005 ), 458-459 and Wijnendaele (2016a , 276-278 that Zosimus most likely equivocated this with a victory by Stilicho over one of Radagaisus' armies. A dynastic campaign under the command of Stilicho's lieutenant Sarus defeated one of the usurper's field armies in open battle and even managed to besiege Constantine himself in . Only the timely arrival of a relief-force hastily levied from Alamannic and Frankish allies ensured that Constantine's regime was not destroyed branch and root before it had barely started, and Sarus retreated with his forces to Italy (Zos. 6.2.6) . This was what a single, central Roman field army could accomplish. Hence Stilicho was not entirely displeased with his Gothic lieutenant's conduct, and Sarus still held a senior post at Ravenna in 408.
11 Similarly, when Constantine tried to seize the Iberian peninsula in 408, his field army suffered a defeat at the hands of a motley crew of local soldiers, servants and retainers raised by members of the Theodosian family.
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Although Stilicho ought to have had far greater military resources at his disposal than did Constantine, the assembly and preparation of a field army for a major campaign necessarily took time.
13 However, he was ready by 408 to launch a new campaign against Constantine from Ticinum. While it is difficult to assess the combined strength of these forces, some estimates are possible. Stilicho had drawn on 30 numeri for his final assault on Radagaisus, a force plausibly estimated between 10,000 and 15,000 men.
14 After the latter's defeat, he subsequently incorporated about 12,000 of his best warriors into his army, meaning Stilicho may have had as many as 25,000 men or more at his disposal in 408. The fact that he did not issue legislation to organize emergency conscription, as had been necessary during the Gildonian crisis or the war against Radagaisus, confirms that he felt that he already had a sufficiently large force.
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II Alaric and Illyricum
During the period 407-408, Stilicho created a stir by pursuing a policy aimed at trying to win the service of Alaric and his Goths for the western empire, rather than crush them as the potentially dangerous enemies that many of his opponents 11 PLRE 2: "Sarus," 978. 12 Soz. 9.11.4-9.12.1; Oros. Hist. 7.40.6-8. 13 Burns (1994) , 212-213 realistically estimates the British comitatenses at roughly 5,000 men during Constantine III's bid for power. Modéran (2014) , 64-72 also presents a useful survey of residual imperial forces in Gaul at the time of the Rhine frontier's collapse, and Constantine III's struggles in salvaging the situation. 14 Wijnendaele (2016a), 270-271 n. 20. 15 Gildo: CTh 7.13.12; Radagaisus: CTh. 7.13.16.
The Downfall of Stilicho feared they were. 16 In particular, it has been argued, from hostile eastern sources, that he tried to use them as his agents in an attempt to annex eastern Illyricum.
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The rationale for this annexation, it is claimed, is that it would have provided him with a new source of recruits and taxes. 18 However, there are several objections to this interpretation. First, Illyricum was an unlikely cornucopia of either recruits or taxes because of the incessant battering which it had suffered during the last quarter of the fourth century, first, during the Gothic wars under Valens and Theodosius I (377-382), then during the civil wars between the latter and the western usurpers Magnus Maximus and Eugenius (388/394), and, finally, during the cold war between Arcadius' and Honorius' courts, which had allowed Alaric to install himself in the region (395) (396) (397) Next, the defeat of Radagaisus had already provided Stilicho with a sudden large new pool of recruits, as mentioned previously, so that there was no immediate 16 For reasons of intellectually honesty, I wish to point out that my reading of Alaric and his Goths' modus operandi is very much a "military" one (as e. g. Liebeschuetz 1990; Halsall 2007; Delaplace 2015) , rather than a "moving peoples" one (as e. g. Heather 1991; Demandt 1998). For a new position in this debate to see Alaric as the champion of an "interest group," see now Gheller (2017) . 17 Soz. 9.4.2-4. Demougeot (1950) ; Jones (1964), 184-185; Matthews (1975), 279; Wolfram (1988), 153; Paschoud (1989), 217; Liebeschuetz (1990), 66-67; Wolfram (1997), 97; Blockley (1998), 121; Drinkwater (1998), 271; Janssen (2004), 215-220; Amidon (2007), 154 n. 7; Halsall (2007), 209; McEvoy (2013), 176; Van Nuffelen (2013), 143; Delaplace (2015), 123-124; Dunn (2015), 385; Mitchell (2015) , 99. See also, however, the reservations of Kulikowski (2007 ), 171. 18 Blockley (1998 Heather (2005) , 219-220; Börm (2013 ), 49. 19 Liebeschuetz (1990 , 67 also remarked that " [t] here certainly is no evidence that [Stilicho] regarded the Balkans as an indispensable recruiting area." 20 Hier. Ep. 60.16 (tr. Wright 1933, slightly emended) . Naturally, one should not accept Jerome's rhetoric prima facie and the archaeological record certainly does not match his picture of an Illyrian wasteland. That being said, it certainly echoes the troubles that had been plaguing this region over the previous two decades. need for any additional manpower in 407. Finally, the strongest argument against an attempted western annexation of eastern Illyricum using Alaric is the fact that Constantinople does not seem to have noticed this, because it maintained good diplomatic relations with Ravenna throughout 407 and 408, as indicated by the fact that the two courts continued to recognize each other's consuls during these years.
21 This is crucial contemporary evidence that has usually been neglected in favour of literary sources drawn up after the events. Yet recognition or the withholding of recognition of consular candidates is a sound criterion for how imperial policies of one court were perceived by its twin et vice versa.
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So what were Stilicho's intentions for Alaric and his Goths? Alaric marched from eastern Illyricum into Noricum with his Gothic army in 407, and Zosimus (5.29.5) interprets this as a hostile incursion, even claiming that Alaric was paid by Stilicho for "his invasion of Italy and Noricum" (Ἰταλíαν καì τò Νωρικòν εἰσβολῆς). However, it is nonsensical to claim that Stilicho paid Alaric to attack Noricum and Italy on his behalf.
23 A more probable explanation is that Stilicho had requested Alaric to move through this region as the first stage of a journey to the West in order to assist against the usurper Constantine III. 24 Alaric will have halted near Emona for supplies, and have then sent word to Stilicho in Ravenna while also bringing up the need to pay his troops. After having received no payment for more than a year, Alaric could reasonably demand gold for his soldiers.
25 Indeed, Zosimus nowhere states that Alaric threatened war, only that 21 CLRE 348-351. 22 Eastern factions had once succeeded in proclaiming Stilicho as hostis rei publicae after his meddling in Balkan affairs and own retaliation against the magister utriusque militiae per Africam Gildo who had transferred his allegiance to Arcadius (Zos. 5.11.1). In return, the western court refused to recognize Eutropius' consulship in 399 (CLRE 333 
III The counter-strike against Constantine III
Scholars have often argued that Alaric was then supposed to lead the campaign against Constantine III, supported by an imperial army already gathering at Ticinum, while Stilicho would embark on his journey to Constantinople. 26 On 1 May, 408, the eastern emperor Arcadius had died and Stilicho pounced upon the opportunity to meddle in the succession. 27 Yet while it may well have been Stilicho's intention to use Alaric and his Goths to spearhead the campaign against Constantine, this does not necessarily mean that Alaric would have been supreme commander also. Here one notes that Zosimus (5.31.5) merely states that Alaric and part of his army was to be sent to Gaul "together with Roman forces and their officers to share the war with him" (τῶν τε σὺν αὐτῷ βαρβάρων ἄγοντα μέρος καì τέλη Ῥωμαΐκὰ καὶ ἡγεμόνας; my emphasis). The focus is naturally on Alaric here, men "were bargaining just like mercenaries enrolled for a specified campaign." However, this does not take into account that Alaric will have expected a significant part of this money to serve as his personal salary for his role as imperial commander. Even today, the regular remuneration for the highest military commands (such as the comites rei militares or magistri militum) remains unknown. Lee (2013a) , 99 points out that it must have been substantial, however, given the eagerness other non-Roman leaders pursued it with. The case of Attila may point in this direction. In the late 440 s Theodosius II's government was forced to pay the Hun monarch an annual indemnity of more than 2000 lb of gold, but this was sent as his "salary" for his nominal rank as Roman general (Priscus Fr. 11.2). On this episode, see now Meier (2015) . For a discussion of the use of honours and gifts towards barbarian leaders under Theodosius I, see Gheller (2017), 62-63; 142-152. Alternatively, Janssen (2004) , 219 suggests that Alaric could have asked for one year of back pay and an advance for the next year, on the calculation of 12 solidi per soldier for 12,000 men. While it is impossible to reconstruct Alaric's entire fighting strength in the half decade between his retreat from Italy and Stilicho's downfall, this may be a plausible estimate. 26 Bury (1923), 171; O'Flynn (1983), 56; Wolfram (1988), 154; Liebeschuetz (1990), 67; Williams and Friell (1994), 137; Wolfram (1997), 97; Drinkwater (1998), 281; Halsall (2007) , 213. 27 For Stilicho's plans regarding Arcadius' succession, see Wijnendaele (forthcoming a).
because he was the main subject of the conversation, and that is all. It is not at all clear that he was to be supreme commander. On the contrary, the presence at Ticinum of the magister militum per Gallias Chariobaudes, the magister equitum praesentalis Vincentius, and the comes domesticorum Salvius suggests otherwise.
28 These were the three most senior commanders of the western Roman army after Stilicho, and the obvious suggestion is that they were there to keep Alaric in check. At best, Alaric was meant to be a partner, not the overall commander, perhaps serving as vicarius or magister militum vacans to Vincentius.
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Strategically this was a sound plan: Alaric's forces could attack Constantine's forces through Raetia and Gaul, while Honorius' relatives were already harassing the usurper's rear forces in Spain (Zos. 6.4). Vincentius' army could then provide the main thrust through the Alps and complete the pincer movement. Precedents in previous late Roman civil wars suggest that such tactics could be devastatingly effective. After the bloody battle of Mursa in 351, Constantius II had encouraged Alamanni to harass his rival Magnentius' brother and co-emperor Decentius across the Rhine, while his main force crossed the Cottian Alps and delivered the killing blow at Mons Seleucus. 30 Similarly, Julian pursued a multi-pronged strategy during his civil war with Constantius II, having his magister equitum Nevitta moving an army from Gaul through Raetia, while another army crossed the Alps into Italy (Amm. Marc. 21.8). Just like the war against Radagaisus, Stilicho could let two subordinate armies launch the first attacks on the enemy in order to wear him down before letting the imperial army finish the job.
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Yet Stilicho's insistence that the Senate pay Alaric's expenses, that the Gothic general would be allowed to participate in the war against Constantine so close to Italy, and that he involve himself eastern affairs, probably filled the western civilian aristocracy with deep resentment. While Stilicho's plans for dealing with the situation in Gaul probably attracted the most criticism, this does not mean that his planned eastern adventure enjoyed much more favour. A decade earlier he had taken a western army into eastern territory and had been proclaimed an 28 Zos 5.32.4. PLRE 1: "Salvius 1," 800 claims that this comes domesticorum is the same person as the scutarius who distinguished himself in 368 against the Alamanni. This is not impossible but unlikely given the vast distance in time, see also Paschoud (1989) The Downfall of Stilicho enemy of the state by Constantinople as a consequence (Zos. 5.11.1). A fundamental difference between his campaign of 397 and that intended for 408 is that the imperial west had still retained its territorial integrity during the former, while by 408 it had lost almost half of its provinces to a usurper. Stilicho's Gothic commander Sarus had already failed to eliminate Constantine III, and the palace ministers may have doubted whether Alaric, another Gothic upstart, could handle the job either. Furthermore, if Stilicho departed for the east and his adventure misfired, the court in Italy would be in a precarious position. They could reasonably fear that another civil war was looming in the Balkans, while that on Italy's western flank had still not been settled. Given that the memory of Radagaisus' invasion was still fresh in mind, who knew what kind of extra burdens could be heaped upon Italy's landed nobility? Finally, one should note that resistance against any co-operation with Alaric may also help explain a mutiny among imperial soldiers near Bologna after Stilicho departed from Rome (Zos. 5.31.1-2). Zosimus does not state the reason for this mutiny, but it may have originated among the men who were instructed to transport gold to Alaric. 32 The idea of paying Alaric, a man whom many of these soldiers had fought against only six years earlier, may have aroused anger and indignation-especially if they had also been instructed to fight alongside him against Constantine thereafter. Stilicho had successfully managed to antagonise both civilian aristocrats and Roman soldiers, and the stage had been set for a coup against him.
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IV The plot against Stilicho
The leader of the palatine cabal which engineered Stilicho's fall was a certain Olympius, who had been personally introduced to the emperor by Stilicho (Olym-32 As Burns (1994), 361-362, n. 130 notes, the transport of so much gold from Italy to Noricum will have required elaborate security. This may be related to the accusation in Philost. HE 12.2 that Stilicho had minted coins without authorization, thus committing a "usurpation"(τυραννíδα). 33 Senatorial contempt about paying Alaric during Stilicho's assembly was already voiced by a certain Lampadius who decried it as a pactio servitutidis (Zos. 5.29.9). See also Matthews (1975), 277-278 and McEvoy (2013) , 179 about senatorial disaffection with Stilicho's policies and its financial repercussions on them. Curiously, Blockley (1992) , 53 asserts that "the eastern government, led by Anthemius, perhaps helped itself by arranging the elimination of Stilicho in the same year as Arcadius' death, a development which greatly eased tensions between the two parts of the Empire". While eastern support for Honorius' court did materialize after Stilicho's downfall, as most clearly evidenced by the 4,000 soldiers sent by Theodosius II to garrison Ravenna during the struggle with Alaric (Soz. 9.8), there are no visible traces of Constantinopolitan involvement in his actual demise. piod. Fr. 5.1). As the magister officiorum, one of his office's responsibilities was to supply the army through the state's fabricae, meaning he will have been well informed about his superior's journey. 34 While Stilicho was planning to travel to Constantinople with four legions, Olympius started disseminating rumours that the generalissimo's real intention was to usurp imperial power for Eucherius.
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Such accusations can easily be dismissed, since such an endeavour would have run counter to his entire career, and the political image as guardian of the Theodosian dynasty that he had carefully crafted over thirteen years (as most conspicuous in the public discourse of his mouthpiece Claudian).
36 It would be outlandish to suppose that Stilicho could have violently installed himself in Constantinople with a mere 5000 men and this force was clearly meant as a guard and nothing more. 37 Indeed, when Stilicho's ministers were subsequently tortured by Olympius' henchmen, they revealed no knowledge of any desire by Stilicho to become emperor, and the torturers eventually had to cease their efforts to procure a confession in this manner (Zos. 5.35.3). Nevertheless, Olympius could have easily distorted precise knowledge about the Ticinum campaign and Stilicho's journey to Constantinople to suggest to a receptive audience-one that had already come to hate the magister utriusque militiae-that Silicho was hell-bent on snatching the throne. Hence, when the emperor arrived in Ticinum in order to address the troops before their despatch against Constantine III, Olympius gave a quiet signal, and the soldiers suddenly attacked the key ministers and officers present there. 38 They also went on to loot the city. Stilicho was not present during the massacre at Ticinum, and so escaped death there. He learned of the massacre while at Bologna, and immediately assembled the leaders of all his barbarian allies. They seem to have remained loyal soldiers of the emperor as yet, because they decided not to launch a fullscale revolt unless the emperor himself had been harmed, but had to focus instead on the leaders of the mutiny (Zos. 5.33.1). However, Stilicho decided against any military action even of this limited kind, both because there was a 34 On the military responsibilities of the magister officiorum, see Jones (1964), 368-369; Elton (1996), 240. 35 Olympiod. Fr. 5.2; Zos. 5.32.1. 36 O'Flynn (1983) , 59 rightly remarks that it would have been political suicide for Stilicho to replace a rightful heir of Theodosius I with his own son. 37 Börm (2013), 49-50 also points out that at this point Honorius was the senior Augustus of the empire and thus, at least in theory, had a right to establish his pre-eminence over the eastern course. It made some sense on Stilicho's behalf that he convinced the western emperor to remain in Italy, given that the usurper Constantine was still at large in Gaul. 38 Olympiod. Fr. 5.2; Zos. 5.32.3-6.
The Downfall of Stilicho real possibility of defeat, given the strength of the Roman forces at the time, and, perhaps more importantly, because such action risked turning the emperor irrevocably against him. Finally, he probably suspected also that certain elements of his barbarian forces, noticeably Sarus and his men, were simply opportunists seeking to turn this situation to their own benefit. Sarus confirmed such suspicion when he suddenly attacked Stilicho's Hunnic guard, killed them all, and captured his baggage train. 39 Stilicho, realizing that he could not in fact trust all of his barbarian allies, sent orders to the cities instructing them to shut their gates to his men. He then proceeded to Ravenna, where he was soon arrested and brought to execution on 22 August, 408.
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The manner in which Stilicho allowed himself to be arrested and executed demonstrates that, despite his extraordinary power, he was still a product of the traditional fourth-century military hierarchy.
41 He fled to a church for sanctuary, while his allies and servants armed themselves in case they were needed. Soldiers retrieved him from the church, and even when it became clear that their instructions had changed, and that they now intended to execute Stilicho rather than simply arrest him, Stilicho still forbade his supporters to intervene and quietly accepted his fate (Zos. 5.34.3-5). In effect, he delayed any open revolt until it was too late. He placed a quiet loyalty in the emperor, hoping that he would eventually realize the truth of the matter, a hope which proved totally misplaced. Finally, at that point where even Stilicho probably realized that he was not going to escape with his life, it was too late, and his main concern then had to be what would happen to his family after him, particularly his son who was present there with him in Ravenna. Unfortunately for him, however, his quiet surrender to his fate did nothing to save his son.
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The same court faction who had engineered Stilicho's downfall seems to have organized a massacre of his barbarian supporters also ). Yet these pogroms cannot be conceived as purely anti-barbarian reprisals. 43 It is true that thousands of enraged barbarian soldiers eventually decided to join Alaric in 39 Zos. 5.34.1. On Sarus' modus operandi in these critical years, see Wijnendaele (2019) . 40 PLRE 1: "Stilicho," 857. 41 Halsall (2007) , 213 for a similar judgment, but with different emphasis. Blockley (1998), 125 and Williams and Friell (1994) , 143 also point out that if Stilicho's policies failed, Theodosius I should share some responsibility since Stilicho had basically continued his. 42 PLRE 2: "Eucherius 1," 405. Noricum after receiving words of the massacre of their families. 44 However, Honorius' court continued using some barbarian soldiers and officers even immediately after Stilicho's fall. 45 The best explanation for the massacre of these particular barbarians, therefore, is that they were singled out because of their association with Stilicho, that is, that Olympius feared that someone among their leaders would eventually seek to avenge the death of Stilicho, or that they would be used by some other group for this purpose. 46 It is worth highlighting this connection further. The war with Radagaisus had raised Stilicho to the peak of his military power. 47 After his victories in Tuscany, Stilicho will have had thousands of Gothic warriors who needed to be integrated in the western Roman military. As Olympiodorus states: "The chiefs of the Goths who were with Radagaisus were called optimates, and they were 12,000 in number. When he had defeated Radagaisus, Stilicho made them his allies." 48 The rounded nature of the number 12,000 has caused it to be questioned by a few scholars.
49 Indeed, it is unlikely that 12,000 aristocrats were left after the defeat of Radagaisus, and this figure probably refers to the better warriors more generally, including some noblemen such as Sarus. However, the number seems reasonable in itself, given the size of Radagaisus' following as a whole, and these warriors were probably enlisted amongst Stilicho's forces, as implied above. He doubtless retained the best among the forces closest to him. It is noteworthy here that Photius' epitome of Olympiodorus' history sets its information concerning the reception of these Gothic warriors into the Roman army between two digressions on the foederati and buccellarii.
50 It seems probable, therefore, that Stilicho recruited the best of 44 Zos. 5.35.6 claims that 30,000 barbarians joined Alaric in Noricum but this number is suspect. See Ridley (1982), 219 n. 129; Burns (1994) , 234. 45 Officers: Generidus (PLRE 2: 500-501), Allobichus (PLRE 2: 61). Olympius commanded 300 Huns against Athaulf in 409 (Zos. 5.45.6) and Honorius supposedly issued orders to the Dalmatian administration that they had to prepare provisions for an army of allegedly 10,000 Huns (Zos.
5.50.1).
46 See Long (1993), 333 and Lee (2013a) , 91-93 for a similar judgment on the Gothic "pogroms" of 400 at Constantinople, that these were directed specifically against Gainas' supporters, not Goths in general. 47 Wolfram (1997 ), 161. 48 Olympiod. Fr. 9 (tr. Blockley 1983 : Ὅτι τῶν μετὰ Ῥοδογάΐσον Γότθων οἱ κεφαλαιῶται ὀπτίματοι ἐκαλοῦντο, εἰς δώδεκα συντείνοντες χιλιάδας, οὕς καταπολεμήσας Στελίχων Ῥοδογάΐ-σον προσηταιρίσατο. 49 Matthews (1975), 274 n. 6; Drinkwater (1998) , 273 n. 23. The number is accepted by the communis opinio however: Heather (1995), 12; Elton (2007), 299; Halsall (2007) 207; Stickler (2007), 506; Fear (2010), 399 n. 448; Sarris (2011), 49; Mitchell (2015), 98. 50 Olympiod. Fr. 7.4; 12. On the nature and development of the buccellarii, see Schmitt (1994) ; Lenski (2009); Wijnendaele (forthcoming b) .
The Downfall of Stilicho
Radagaisus' former warriors among his own buccellarii. 51 As subsequent events were to show, Stilicho's use of these defeated barbarians was a major departure from previous imperial policy.
Throughout the third and fourth century, the imperial government favoured breaking up defeated war-bands into smaller units and settling them in areas scattered across the empire. 52 Consequentially, this would help breaking down previous ethnic ties and thus help assimilating these warriors in the Roman military and ensure their allegiance to the state. Instead, Stilicho did not disperse these men but kept most-if not all-of Radagaisus' defeated armies close to him in Italy. 53 Prior to their invasion these men would have come from a tradition of fighting in war-bands and owing allegiance to a lord, in this case Radagaisus. 54 Loyalty to a state such as the Roman Empire may have been an abstract concept to many of them. Olympiodorus' language could be interpreted as Stilicho actually replacing Radagaisus' position and thus allowing them to continue their tradition of allegiance to an individual. This enabled Stilicho to expand the number of retainers in his service, so that he now controlled an army within an army. This should not necessarily be seen as some sinister scheme on Stilicho's part, but simply as a short-term measure given his previous difficulties in muster-51 It should also be observed here that, as earlier mentioned, Stilicho had kept a Hunnic bodyguard until his downfall. Most probably, these had also been recruited after his victory over Radagaisus, for which he had originally contracted the services of the Hunnic chieftain Uldin: see Wijnendaele (2016a) , 275-276. 52 On this policy, see: Burns (1994), 1-23; Lee (2007), 81-85 . This is particularly well attested in the successful integration of the former Alamanni leaders Vadomarius (PLRE 1: "Vadomarius," 928) and Fraomarius (PLRE 1: "Fraomarius," 372) as imperial commanders, yet stationed as far away as respectively the Levant and Britain. 53 This can be inferred from their role in the events surrounding Stilicho's downfall in Italy, the persecutions Honorius' government subsequently enacted against them, and their flight en masse to Alaric in nearby Noricum. One may note that the identification of Stilicho's auxiliaries fleeing to Alaric as former warriors of Radagaisus, is one of the rare cares where the otherwise diametrically opposed Heather (1996) 146-151 and Kulikowski (2019) 79 n. 20 are in agreement. For an alternative interpretation, see Gheller (2017) , 65-66. 54 The nature of barbarian leadership prior to the migration era is still a vexed topic: see Halsall (2007) , 121-125. An important question, which cannot be investigated further since it would vastly exceed the scope of the current research, is how different the barbarian kings of the fifth-century groups were to those emerging warlord-commanders in the western imperial army (on the latter see Wijnendaele 2016 b; 2018) . One useful angle, followed by Halsall (2007) and Kulikowski (2012) is to see "kingship" as an Ersatz for those barbarian leaders working within the empire but excluded from the imperial high command. For further discussion on barbarian leadership, see the various studies in Pohl (1998) and Gillett (2002). ing manpower. The potential danger of this practice, as future events would show, is that these men kept a sense of their worth and power.
V Conclusion
In his seminal work on Stilicho, Santo Mazzarino once stated that in surprisingly quick fashion Stilicho had gone "dagli altari alla polvere."
55 By the start of the summer of 408, Stilicho may have reasonably judged that he had militarily everything under control. Certainly, Constantine III had been punching above his weight when he tried to establish himself in the Transalpine provinces with the very last comitatenses of Britain. He already had his hands full with the dual challenge of pinning down the barbarian war-bands who had crossed the Rhine in northern Gaul, and the Theodosian resistance in the Iberian peninsula.
56 If the Ticinum campaign had ever launched, backed with Alaric's auxiliary army, there seems little doubt that it would have been Constantine's head rolling from the executioner's block in 408. At the same time, enough resources were at hand for Stilicho to simultaneously pursue his highly ambitious plans to have his say in the imperial succession at the eastern court. Yet what finally brought the western generalissimo down was not military strategy but a thorough underestimation how much the western nobility took umbrage over his tactics in accomplishing this goal.
57 Stilicho basically squandered the political capital he had carefully accumulated over more than a decade by pushing through an overambitious agenda while ignoring the sensitivities of his "constituency."
The most enduring charge against Stilicho was not his adfectatio regni but that he could never entirely dissociate himself from his barbarian auxiliaries.
58
The enigmatic creator of the Historia Augusta, who may have been a contemporary of Stilicho, had already remarked that "the aid that Romans received from barbarian auxiliaries must be felt not seen" (sentiendum esse non videndum cum auxiliaribus barbaris Romanus iuvatur).
59 While one may earnestly doubt the The Downfall of Stilicho validity of this pastiche as a source for historical inquiry regarding its Kaisergeschichte, the sentiment it reveals in this passage would have resonated loudly with the landed aristocracy of Italy. To fully appreciate the dénouement of the events of 408, we have to retrace our steps to Stilicho's victory over Radagaisus in 406 and its reverberations the following years. Thousands of Gothic warriors remained close together in an imperial province, this time the political heartland of the imperial west. The dual nature of these warriors as imperial troops, but personally bound to Stilicho, meant that he could exploit them to serve his needs first and only secondarily those of the state. In this way, while Radagaisus' invasion initially posed an external threat, it soon had important consequences for the development of the western Roman army, resulting in the emergence of an internal threat also in due course. This mass influx of Gothic retainers would play a destabilizing role in subsequent political events, especially when they were used as semi-private powerbases for ambitious individuals such as Alaric, Athaulf or Sarus, ultimately culminating in the sack of Rome in 410. Orosius' dictum on Radagaisus' defeat as a triumph and tragedy certainly rings true for Stilicho himself: "we won the battle, but were vanquished in our victory" (Oros. 7.37.2: pugnantes uicimus, uictores uicti sumus).
